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Abstract 
While research on factors driving corporate investment decisions has blossomed, knowledge related 
to the Chief Executive Officer’s (CEO’s) market sentiment on investment decision outcomes is 
lacking. In this study, we extend the existing corporate finance literature by examining the 
underexplored issue of how CEOs’ market sentiment drives firms’ investment decisions. Capitalising 
on a large sample of US firms for the period 2004-2014, we uncovered some crucial observations. 
First, we found empirical support for our theoretical contention that market sentiment drives corporate 
investment decisions. Second, we established that, while financial flexibility induces managers to 
overinvest, the expectation of future profitability leads firms to underinvest during high sentiment 
periods. In addition, we uncovered that the 2007/08 financial crisis significantly impacted firm 
behaviour and realigned managerial decision-making. Thus, the sentiment-investment relationship is 
more pronounced during the crisis and the post-crisis periods. Our results are robust after accounting 
for the possibility of endogeneity and using alternative measures of both CEOs’ market sentiment and 
firm investment.  
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1. Introduction 
Behavioural finance literature has argued that managerial decisions are affected by psychological 
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and/or cognitive biases (e.g. Baker et al., 2013; Ben-David et al., 2013; Malmendier et al., 2011). 
Building on this view, research in behavioural finance has highlighted how managerial behaviours 
drive corporate decisions. Principal among these encompass size premium (Lemmon & Portniaguina, 
2006), divergence from fundamental equity values (Shefrin, 2008; De Long et al., 1990), IPO under-
pricing and long-run returns (Boulton & Campbell, 2016; Cornelli et al., 2006; Ljungqvist et al., 2006). 
However, while these studies reaffirm the broad relevance of managerial traits in driving corporate 
decision-making processes, the literature has failed to establish how market sentiment – decision-
makers’ beliefs and feelings about a situation or event (Hribar et al., 2017) – drives corporate 
investment decision. In addition, our understanding relating to how this linkage is conditioned by 
financial flexibility, future profitability and financial crisis lacks theoretical precision.  
Indeed, from the agency theoretical perspective, the influx of free cash flow and unused debt 
capacity influences managerial choices to invest more, consequently increasing investment distortions 
(Malmendier & Tate, 2005; Stulz, 1990; Jensen, 1986). Similarly, the fix-price theory of investment 
(Kotlar et al., 2014; Precious, 1985; Malinvaud, 1980) stipulates that expected future profitability 
enhances willingness to increase investment in additional capacity towards meeting possible upward 
demand fluctuations (Greve, 2003). Such a condition is prevalent during high sentiment periods. On 
the other hand, the trade-off theory (DeAngelo et al., 2011) stresses that higher expected future 
profitability implies a generally low chance of financial distress (Fama & French, 2002). Thus, such 
firms are able to access external financing for good future investment projects. Beyond these 
underpinnings, the issue of market sentiment in corporate decision-making is vitally important given 
that managers often have a comprehensive opinion on their firms’ performance, customers, suppliers 
and industry dynamics. By developing and utilising networks with business leaders, politicians, 
academia and media, managers are able to gain a unique insight into the conditions in the industry in 
which their firms operate. These conditions are critical for strategic decision-making processes.  
This study contributes to the finance literature in the following ways. First, we integrate the 
behavioural economics and finance disciplines with the social psychology literature. In doing so, we 
complement the literature exploring the relationship between managerial traits and corporate policies 
(e.g. Ho et al., 2016; Graham et al., 2013; Malmendier et al., 2011; Hackbarth, 2008). Thus, we enrich 
the literature by shedding light on managers’ market sentiment as an indication of confidence in 
business, industry and economic fundamentals which drives firm investment levels. Second, we 
establish a financial flexibility perspective under which market sentiment leads a firm to overinvest 
during high sentiment periods. Financial flexibility decreases the firm’s cost of capital, thereby 
reducing the competitive risk faced by the firm and the strategic benefit of unused debt capacity 
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(O’Brien, 2003). Moreover, financially flexible firms have greater access to external capital markets 
to meet funding challenges arising from unanticipated earnings shortfalls and/or new growth prospects 
and hence avoid situations that may lead to suboptimal investment and poor performance (Arslan-
Ayaydin et al., 2014). Similarly, the pecking order theory of capital structure stresses that firms 
accumulate financial slack to avoid the need for external funds in financing future investment 
opportunities (Myers 1984; Myers & Majluf 1984), hence drawing the conclusion that firms maintain 
financial flexibility to avoid the costs of underinvestment (Froot et al., 1993). We therefore contend 
that financially flexible firms can secure cheaper financing (both free-cash and external debt financing) 
to make positive net present value (NPV) investments that otherwise lacked funding. This lowered 
cost of capital results in overinvestment which can also turn negative NPV investments into positive 
NPV projects. 
Third, we also show that future profitability (the expectations perspective) plays an important 
role in the sentiment-investment relationship. The standard economic theory (see Bond et al., 2004) 
stresses that direct measures of expected future profitability significantly drive firm investment 
behaviour (Kotlar et al., 2014). Additionally, behavioural theory stipulates that firm profitability 
fundamentally drives firm investment decisions (Cyert & March, 1963). Thus, we contend that, when 
firm profitability goals are expected to be achieved, managers tend to undertake adverse goals via 
decreasing investments. Hence, under the expectation of future profits, firms tend to underinvest.  
Finally, strategic management distinctly places emphasis on the firm’s competitive 
environment (Drnevich & Kriauciunas, 2011; Ngah-Kiing Lim et al., 2009). A firm must find a balance 
or fit between the demands of its environment and its internal management systems in order to survive 
and succeed (Katsikeas et al., 2006; Pegels et al., 2000). Hence, by assessing the differential effect of 
sentiment on investment across the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods, we highlight the extent to which 
the 2007/08 financial crisis effects realigned managerial decision-making. We confirm that the most 
suitable management strategy and organisational structure for any given firm is a product of the 
specific set of environmental contingencies a firm faces (O'Brien et al., 2014; Acquaah, 2007). We 
therefore make contributions to complement these underpinnings. 
The paper closest to our own is Gennaioli et al. (2016). They found that firm investment is 
impacted by Chief Financial Officers’ (CFOs) expectations of earnings growth. However, among the 
limitations acknowledged in their work is the limited data and failure of their expectation measure to 
capture economic conditions. Our paper utilises a more plausible measure of sentiment that captures 
the manager’s perspective in the US and contains the opinions of corporate chief executive officers on 
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the state of the economy, their firm’s profit expectations, market/demand growth, cost reduction, price 
increments and new technology improvements.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 reviews the relevant literature and key 
theoretical underpinnings. Section 3 discusses the sample, empirical design and measurement of 
variables. Section 4 presents the regression results and discussion. Finally, section 5 provides a 
summary of the findings and outlines the practical implications. 
 
2. Literature  
2.1 Theoretical perspective 
Agency theory confirms the premise of the rational choice theory by suggesting that agents are rational 
decision-makers whose goal is to maximise utility (Shapiro, 2005; Boudon, 1998; Simon, 1955). 
Nevertheless, extant psychology literature evidences that an individual’s decision often deviates from 
this conventional paradigm (Ho et al., 2016; Graham et al., 2013; Malmendier et al., 2011; Hackbarth, 
2008). Thus, in a survey of behavioural corporate finance literature, Baker et al. (2013) identified 
numerous managerial behavioural biases evidenced to influence corporate decisions. Key among these 
biases are managerial overconfidence and optimism (Malmendier et al., 2011; Heaton, 2002; Griffin 
& Tversky, 1992). The managerial overconfidence theory postulates a ‘better-than-average’ effect 
under which overconfident individuals often overvalue their wisdom or skills beyond an average 
benchmark (Ho et al., 2016; Alicke, 1985; Svenson, 1981; Larwood & Whittaker, 1977). Thus, their 
expectation of favourable future events is greater than the likelihood of occurrence, under the 
assumption that they possess more precise knowledge about future events.  
An extension of the psychology literature to behavioural corporate finance proves that 
executives or managers are predominantly susceptible to exhibiting these behavioural biases, which 
consequently affects their decisions (Hirshleifer, 2015; Andriosopoulos et al., 2013; Landier & 
Thesmar, 2009). Firstly, managers tend to demonstrate high degrees of confidence under the 
perception that outcomes are within their control (March & Shapira, 1987). Secondly, they 
demonstrate higher optimism about uncertain outcomes when they assign higher degrees of 
commitment to the outcomes (Weinstein, 1980). Accordingly, managerial irrationality plays a central 
role in corporate financing behaviour. Following this reasoning, Parsons and Titman (2008) confirm 
that managerial preferences may have an impact on capital structures. Similarly, Bertrand and Schoar 
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(2003) show that manager fixed effects significantly explain heterogeneity in firms’ financial practices. 
In keeping with the above, recent theoretical advances in finance literature confirm that 
managerial behavioural biases significantly affect investment and financing decisions (Ben-David et 
al., 2013; Campbell et al., 2011; Malmendier & Tate, 2005, 2008; Shefrin, 2001). For instance, Shefrin 
(2001) postulates that overconfident and optimistic traits of managers affect their financing decisions. 
Following this reasoning, Hackbarth (2008) and Heaton (2002) introduced a theoretical model which 
proved that optimistic and/or overconfident managers tend to opt for a higher leverage level beyond 
what is optimal/rational. Hackbarth (2009) reports that overconfident managers feel their firm’s equity 
is highly undervalued by the capital market and hence favour debt issuance to equity when seeking 
external finance.  
2.2. Empirical literature  
The question of whether and how management overconfidence and miscalibration impact corporate 
investment policies has also become a key strand in empirical corporate finance literature. 
Overconfident managers believe in their ability to generate higher returns on their investment projects, 
often leading to overinvestment (see Pikulina et al., 2017; Ben-David et al., 2013; Graham et al., 2013; 
Campbell et al., 2011; Goel & Thakor, 2008; Malmendier & Tate, 2005, 2008). Thus, they overvalue 
the returns of their investment projects and misperceive negative NPV projects as value creating (Kim 
et al., 2016). Malmendier et al. (2011) demonstrate that overconfidence induces managers to perceive 
their firms as being undervalued and thus perceive external financing, particularly equity, as 
overpriced. As such, managers utilise less external finance – and, in this case, equity – relative to their 
peers.  
Malmendier and Tate (2005) stipulate that overconfident managers also have higher optimism 
regarding investment opportunities. Thus, they tend to overestimate the true value of their firm’s 
equity. In another study, Malmendier and Tate (2008) report that overconfident managers undertake 
greater acquisitions under the assumption that firms are undervalued. Consequently, the market 
reactions for such managers are significantly adverse. Ferris et al. (2013) extended the managerial 
overconfidence literature to international mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and found that 
overconfidence affects the number of manager’s offers, the frequencies of non-diversifying and 
diversifying acquisitions, and the preference for cash to finance merger deals. Ben-David et al. (2013) 
also argue that managerial miscalibration drives numerous corporate finance activities. They argue 
that miscalibrated managers tend to invest more, utilise more debt, are more unlikely to pay dividends, 
and are more likely to repurchase shares, as well as use more long-term debt relative to short-term debt 
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(Andriosopoulos et al., 2013). Hirshleifer et al. (2012) emphasise that overconfident managers tend to 
overvalue the net discounted expected payoffs from uncertain projects, either due to their universal 
expectation of favourable outcomes or due to the overestimation of their successful chances. They 
found that overconfident managers channel higher return volatility and higher investment in 
innovations, acquire more patents and patent citations, and achieve higher success in innovative 
research and developments.  
In addition, Kim et al. (2016) argue that overconfident managers tend to overlook privately 
observed negative feedbacks. Consequently, negative NPV projects are maintained over time, leading 
to bad performance, which causes stock prices to crash. In addition, the overconfidence effect on crash 
risk is more pronounced when the manager is more dominant in the top management team and where 
there exist greater disparities of opinion among investors. 
Other strands of literature have also proved that other managerial traits can significantly affect 
key corporate choices including capital structure (Cronqvist et al., 2012), innovation (Galasso & 
Simcoe, 2011; Hirshleifer et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2015), financing choices (Dong et al., 2012), 
forecasting (Hribar & Yang, 2016) and risk-taking attitude (Huang et al., 2016; Daniel & Hirshleifer, 
2015; Masulis & Mobbs, 2011). Frank and Goyal (2007) demonstrate that manager characteristics 
significantly affect the variations in leverage across firms. Yim (2013) found a positive nexus between 
manager age and M&A. Song and Thakor (2006) examine the motivations that induce a manager to 
provide inaccurate signals about proposed investment projects to the board. Hermalin and Katz (2000) 
introduced a framework under which a manager has incentives to prefer less informative regimes than 
would be desired by firm owners (shareholders). Indeed, existing literature has demonstrated that firm 
investment decisions may be influenced by investor sentiment (Arif & Lee, 2014). Thus, higher 
investor sentiment leads to overinvestment in capital expenditures via overestimation of future cash 
flows from investments. This consequently destroys firm value and, consistent with business cycle 
literature, weakens future stock returns (Arif & Lee, 2014). Gennaioli et al. (2016) and Kothari et al. 
(2016) also found that managers are extrapolative and slow in updating their expectations regarding 
past-year earnings and returns, which consequently slows down their responses. As such, managers 
may begin to respond by making plans to cut investments after observing the past year’s negative 
earnings surprises and low stock returns, but the actual decline in investment occurs two years after 
due to the investment lags. Along similar lines, Lee et al. (2018) reported that managerial ability 
impacts investment positively, particularly for highly financially flexible firms. 
Rather than using investor sentiment, our paper employs CEOs’ sentiment and argues that 
Page 7 of 40 
 
manager sentiment affects a firm’s investment choices in three ways. First, market sentiment impacts 
on firm investment when managers incorporate future profit levels into their strategic decisions. 
Second, under high or positive sentiment periods, financially flexible firms can secure both cheaper 
internal and external debt financing to make positive NPV investments that otherwise lacked funding. 
This lowered cost of capital can, however, drive high levels of investment, particularly negative NPV 
projects. Third, when economic conditions are positive, as observed before the crisis, managers 
perceive that the positive state will continue and thus undertake high investments without incorporating 
the economic outlook (Grout & Zalewska, 2016; Vortelinos, 2016; Cohen et al., 2014). A fundamental 
increase in market sentiment post-crisis, however, increases demand for loanable funds, consequently 
increasing the total level of investment under high monitoring (Bhimjee et al., 2016). 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
Our study is based on a large sample of US firms whose balance sheet and income statements were 
obtained from the merged Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)/Compustat database for the 
period 2004 to 2014. In addition to this, the managerial sentiment data was obtained from the 
Conference Board Measure of CEO Confidence Survey. In all, a total number of 76,166 firm-year 
observations were used in this study.  
3.1. Measurement of variables 
3.1.1. Firm investment 
Following the extant literature (e.g. Dang 2011; Aivazian et al., 2005), our dependent variable 
(investment-INV1) is measured as the ratio of net capital expenditure (capital expenditure minus 
depreciation) of firm i to the book value of total property, plant and equipment for the current year. As 
a robustness check, we also used two additional measures of firm investment. These are (a) Investment 
2 (INV2), the ratio of total capital expenditure of firm i to the book value of total property, plant and 
equipment for the current year (Chava & Roberts, 2008); and (b) Investment 3 (INV3), the ratio of net 
capital expenditure (capital expenditure minus depreciation) of firm i to book value of total assets for 
the current year (Firth et al., 2008). 
3.1.2. Market sentiment 
In line with the existing literature (e.g. Delis et al., 2014; Bachmann & Sims, 2011; Best, 2008), the 
Conference Board’s quarterly measure of CEO Confidence Survey was used as our instrument to 
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gauge market sentiment. This survey has been available at a quarterly frequency since 1976. This 
sentiment data encompasses the responses of CEOs from 10 industrial sectors that span the economic 
activity of the US. These sectors are manufacturing of non-durables – (i) food, textiles and apparel; 
(ii) paper, printing, publishing; (iii) chemicals, petroleum and rubber; manufacturing of durables – (iv) 
metal; (v) machinery; and services – (vi) utilities; (vii) wholesale and retail trade; (viii) banking and 
financing; (ix) insurance; (x) business services. The survey contains four questions to gauge the 
following: current (i) economic conditions compared to six months ago, (ii) conditions in the specific 
industry to which each CEO belongs compared to six months ago; and expectations about (iii) the 
economy six months ahead and (iv) the specific industry six months ahead. The available answers are 
classified and weighted numerically as substantially better (=100), moderately better (=75), same 
(=50), moderately worse (=25) and substantially worse (=0). To compute the primary sentiment value, 
the values of the answers to questions one through three are averaged into a number ranging from 0-
100. Lower values of this index reflect poor market sentiment (or higher CEO anxiety) (Delis et al., 
2014). 
The survey also includes two supplementary questions, which are totalled, averaged and 
reported as a separate headline number for each industry and aggregately. These two supplementary 
questions with their respective answer choices are: (1) What are your firm’s profit expectations for the 
next 12 months? Answer choices: (i) increase substantially; (ii) increase moderately; (iii) remain the 
same; (iv) decrease; and (2) If you expect profits to increase, which do you foresee as the prime source 
of improvement? Answer choices: (i) market/demand growth; (ii) cost reduction; (iii) price increase; 
(iv) new technology. Inherently, high confidence among industry executives indicates that money can 
be more confidently invested in firms belonging to that industry and vice versa.  
Indeed, the survey data serves as the closest attempt to capture the manager’s perspective in 
the US and contains the opinions/sentiment of high-level corporate executive officers on the state of 
the economy, their firm’s profit expectations, market/demand growth, cost reduction and price 
increments, as well as new technology improvements. In addition to this, the survey has proven to have 
important predictive power, helping to forecast macroeconomic indicators (e.g. GDP, interest rates, 
etc.) even after controlling for a host of factors (see Shapiro et al., 2018; Levanon, 2010; ; Medoff et 
al., 2004; Souleles, 2004; Carroll et al., 1994).  
3.1.3. Control variables 
In line with other empirical studies (Firth et al., 2008; Aivazian et al., 2005a, b), we controlled for 
other variables that are likely to affect firm investment. These variables include firm size, asset 
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tangibility, non-debt tax shield, return on assets, firm growth, dividend, earnings volatility. To 
determine whether sentiments are driven by correlations of systematic or idiosyncratic returns, we 
disaggregate the stock returns to a systematic component and an idiosyncratic component by applying 
the standard CAPM model (Vendrame et al., 2016; Panousi & Papanikolaou, 2012). Descriptions of 
all the variables used are presented in Table 1. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
3.2. Estimation method 
In this section, we model the empirical relationship between market sentiment and firm investment. 
Specifically, we employed the following econometric framework:  
 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼+ 𝛽𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡  𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡             
Where i denotes the ith firm and t denotes fiscal year. Investment is the measure of firm-level 
investment as defined in Table 1, market sentiment is the measure of business, industry and economic 
outlook by year t, X is the vector of the control variables employed in our analysis, α and β are 
parameters, ωi is a firm fixed effect, and μt is a year fixed effect. The model can be estimated using 
OLS; however, this approach may cause biases and inconsistent estimates due to correlation of the 
firm fixed effects with the explanatory variables (Wooldridge, 2009). Hence, we estimated these 
models using the panel fixed effects approach and use pooled OLS only for a robustness check. We 
controlled for time fixed effects by including time dummies in all estimations. In order to control for 
possible heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation within firms, the estimated standard errors of the 
regression coefficients are clustered at the firm level. In line with Jiang et al. (2018), all sentiment 
indexes are standardised to have zero mean, unit variance and higher values for higher sentiment levels. 
All continuous variables are winsorised at their 1st and 99th percentiles to mitigate the effect of outliers 
(Fosu et al., 2016; Dudley, 2012). Finally, to deal with potential reverse causality between dependent 
and independent variables, we followed the existing literature (e.g. Danso et al., 2019; Danso & 
Adomako, 2014; Zou and Xiao, 2006) and lag the explanatory variables by one period. A summary of 
the key variables used in our main analyses and their descriptions are reported in Table 1.  
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4. Results and Discussion 
4.1. Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations 
[Table 2 about here] 
[Table 3 about here] 
The descriptive statistics of the variables for our empirical analysis are presented in Table 2. Our three 
(3) measures of firm investment have mean values of -0.07, 0.28 and 0.00. These variables also have 
a standard deviation of 0.34, 0.28 and 0.05, respectively. In general, our measures of firm investment 
show a low level of variability. Further, the mean value of our main sentiment variable (MSent) is 0.54 
with a standard deviation of 0.08. This variable rises from a minimum of 0.35 to a maximum of 0.67, 
suggesting a fair or moderate degree of heterogeneity across the firms investigated. With regards to 
the control variables, a few findings are worth noting. First, we observed that the mean value of Size 
(SIZ) is 5.34 with a standard deviation of 2.52. SIZ has a minimum and maximum value of 0.47 and 
9.75, respectively, signifying a high degree of heterogeneity. Also, the average value of the ROA is 
0.04 and has a standard deviation of 0.23. This variable also has a minimum value of -0.65 and a 
maximum value of 0.32, suggesting that some of the firms investigated experienced negative returns 
during the period of investigation. In Table 3, we present the correlation between all the variables used 
in this study. In general, the evidence obtained from the correlation matrix, as well as the descriptive 
statistics, suggests that our sample does not seem to suffer from any serious issues such as 
multicollinearity, limited variation and heterogeneity or large outliers. 
4.2. Market sentiment and investment 
In Table 4, we present the empirical results of our baseline model by testing the effect of market 
sentiment on firm investment (INV1), which is our main measure of our dependent variable. Two main 
estimation methods are used, OLS and fixed effects (hereafter FE). Models 1 & 2, 5 & 6 and 9 &10 
are based on FE and the rest are OLS. The interpretation of the findings is based on the fully specified 
FE. The OLS is used as a robustness check. Also, models 1 – 4 are based on our main measure of 
investment (INV1) as defined in Table 1. Models 5 to 12 are used as robustness checks. The discussion 
starts with Model 2 where market sentiment (MSent) is positively and significantly related to firm 
investment (INV1). The coefficient of this variable is 0.616 and has a standard deviation of 0.08. This 
suggests that a one standard deviation increase in manager sentiment is associated with a 4.93% 
increase in firm investment.  
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 [Table 4 about here] 
We confirm the findings of the positive relationship between market sentiment and firm 
investment by using alternative measures of investment (i.e. INV2 and INV3) as defined in Table 1. 
Across all the models, MSent is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. Overall, our 
findings are consistent with the view that market sentiment is an indication of business and economic 
conditions (e.g. Bachmann & Sims, 2011; Delis et al., 2014) and thus driving the investment decisions 
of their firms.   
4.3. Robustness checks 
[Table 5 about here] 
[Table 6 about here] 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
The analysis above consistently shows that market sentiment drives corporate investment. In 
this section, we further examine if our results are robust to alternative sentiment measures and 
econometric method. From Tables 5 to 7, we demonstrate that our results are robust to using the Small 
Business Optimism Index (SBOpt), Michigan Sentiment Index (UCSent) and the Chicago Board 
Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX) (as alternative measures of sentiment) on all the three 
measures of investment. We note that the coefficient of sentiment (on SBOpt, UCSent and VIX) is 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level on all models with controls, thus also suggesting 
that market sentiment increases firm investment. Further, in Table 8 we again estimate our main 
models by adopting a 2-step Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimation approach (Blundell 
& Bond, 1998) to address any endogeneity issues. Given the relatively large dataset used in our study, 
we report 2-step estimation results with GMM standard errors. Evidence obtained from our GMM 
results shows that the signs and the magnitude of the coefficient of our independent variable (MSent) 
remain similar to what is already reported in Table 4 (i.e. positive and significant at the 1% level). 
Generally, the results obtained from the GMM estimation suggest that the findings are not plagued by 
endogeneity problems and that the main results reported in Table 4 are robust to an alternative 
econometric model.  
[Table 8 about here] 
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4.4. Sentiment and investment – the role of financial flexibility 
[Table 9 about here] 
 
The evidence presented above indicates that market sentiment leads a firm to increase 
investment. However, an additional mechanism through which market sentiment might lead a firm to 
increase investment is underpinned by the two conventional paradigms for investment distortions: 
manager-shareholders’ conflict of interests (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and asymmetric information 
between managers and lenders (Myers & Majluf, 1984). These paradigms drive investment to be 
sensitive to firms’ free cash flow (see Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990). By the agency theory, managers tend 
to overinvest in order to secure private benefits (e.g. ‘perks’, incentives, large empires, entrenchments, 
etc.) (Malmendier & Tate, 2005). Because external capital market restrictions mitigate the degree of 
managers’ self-centred investment, an influx of free cash flow increases their choices to invest more, 
consequently increasing investment distortions (Jensen, 1986). Thus, excessive free cash flow drives 
high investments (particularly negative NPV projects) (Richardson, 2002; Blanchard et al., 1994). 
Contrarily, with limited free cash flows, overinvestment is mitigated given that firms are induced to 
raise funds via external capital markets characterised by enhanced monitoring (Richardson, 2006). 
Similarly, under asymmetric information, managers in performing their fiduciary role limit external 
financing primarily to avoid diluting the firms’ (undervalued) shares/ownership. Under such a 
scenario, free cash flow increases investment, but mitigates distortions (Fazzari et al., 1988). Thus, 
following these arguments, financial flexibility may bias our finding of a positive sentiment-
investment nexus. We conduct several tests to assess whether financial flexibility could confound our 
sentiment-investment inferences. 
In Table 9, we augment our baseline specification regressing firm investment on the market 
indicator to control for financial flexibility. Following Arslan-Ayaydin et al. (2014), we used the 
median values of cash holdings and leverage ratios to initially generate four subsamples of firms: (i) 
low leverage (LL); (ii) high leverage (HL); (iii) low cash (LC); and (iv) high cash (HC) firms. In 
addition, two more robust groupings of firms were incorporated by merging the policy specification 
simultaneously: (v) low leverage and high cash (LL-HC); and (vi) high leverage and low cash (HL–
LC) firms. Panel A reports the results for the simplified groupings while Panel B shows the more 
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robust combinations. 
Following the grouping of firms into flexible and less flexible subsamples, our results indicate 
that financial flexibility does not confound the significant nexus between the market sentiment 
indicator and firm investment. Nevertheless, the estimated impact (measured by the size of the 
coefficients) of the market sentiment indicator on firm investment indicates that flexibility does affect 
the sensitivity of the sentiment-investment nexus. For low cash flow (LC) and high leverage (HL) 
(implying less financial flexibility) firms, the estimated sentiment-investment coefficient declined. 
However, for high cash flow (HC) and low leverage firms (LL) (implying high financial flexibility), 
the estimated sentiment-investment coefficient increased. In terms of economic significance, while the 
sentiment-investment coefficient for LC and HL firms drops from 0.604 (main result in Table 4) to 
0.451 and 0.411 respectively, that of HC and LL firms rises to 0.774 and 0.985 respectively. This 
finding implies that an influx of free cash flow and unused debt capacity intensifies managers’ choices 
to invest more during high sentiment periods, which may consequently increase investment distortions. 
Contrarily, under conditions of limited free cash flow and used debt capacity, overinvestment is 
mitigated during high sentiment periods given that firms are induced to raise funds via external capital 
markets characterised by enhanced monitoring. 
4.4.1 Financial flexibility by low leverage and high cash balances  
Despite its valuable insights, the analysis so far can be misleading given that it is based on a 
univariate setting and considers the cash and leverage positions of firms distinctly to group firms into 
different groups. However, firm cash holdings and leverage choices are strongly interrelated (e.g. 
pecking order theory (POT) – Arslan-Ayaydin et al., 2014; Fama & French, 2002; Titman & Wessels, 
1988). In this sense, an adjustment in one policy variable leads to an adjustment in the other policy 
variables (see Gatchev et al., 2010). Thus, firms may opt to achieve financial flexibility via both high 
cash flow and low leverage policies simultaneously. Following this reasoning, we augmented our firm 
groupings on the basis of both policies: high cash flow-low leverage (HCLL) versus low cash flow-
high leverage (LCHL) firms. The findings as reported in panel B of Table 9 confirm our observation 
above that highly flexible firms (HCLL) have a higher likelihood of overinvesting relative to low 
flexibility firms (LCHL). Highly flexible firms possess sufficient internal funds and unused debt 
capacity for investments. They also undergo fewer disciplinary or monitoring mechanisms by the 
capital market or corporate governance, and thus they overinvest. The result confirms the position of 
Myers and Majluf (1984) that liquid financial assets (slack) can mitigate the underinvestment biases. 
However, the combined effect of an influx of free cash flow and incomplete shareholder monitoring 
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causes manager-shareholder agency problems (Vogt, 1994). Consequently, managers develop the 
tendency to overinvest (particularly in negative-NPV projects) (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Where 
firms lack sufficient internal funds and debt capacity, they are reluctant to issue new equity due to 
perceived stock undervaluation by the market. Thus, low flexibility firms restrict their investment 
during high sentiment periods characterised by good economic and business signals. 
4.5. Sentiment and investment – the role of future profitability 
[Table 10 about here] 
 
The evidence presented above indicates that financial flexibility strengthens the sentiment-
investment nexus. However, an additional mechanism through which market sentiment might lead a 
firm to increase investment is underpinned by standard economic theory (see Bond et al., 2004), which 
stresses that direct measures of expected future profitability significantly drive the behaviour of firm 
investment (Kotlar et al., 2014). Moreover, behavioural theory stipulates that a fundamental driver of 
investment decisions is profitability (Cyert & March, 1963). Thus, when firm profitability goals remain 
unachieved, managers tend to undertake adverse goals via increasing investments (Fiegenbaum et al., 
1996; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). The fix-price theory of investment (Driver et al., 2005; Lambert 
& Mulkay, 1987; Precious, 1985; Malinvaud, 1980) also argues that profitability plays a key role 
particularly due to demand uncertainty, a condition prevalent during high sentiment periods. Higher 
future profitability enhances willingness to increase investment in additional capacity towards meeting 
possible upward fluctuations in demand (Bhaskar & Glyn, 1995). The trade-off theory (e.g. DeAngelo 
et al., 2011) also stipulates that higher expected future profitability implies a generally low chance of 
financial distress (Fama & French, 2002) to support external financing for good future investment 
projects (positive NPV projects). Thus, following these arguments, higher expected future profitability 
may bias our finding of a positive sentiment-investment nexus. We conducted several tests to assess 
whether higher expected profitability could confound our sentiment-investment inferences. 
In Table 10, we augmented our baseline specification regressing firm investment on the 
managerial indicator to control for future profitability. Specifically, we included not only the current 
value, but also one-year, two-year and three-year leads of the profitability measure, and conducted 
separate analyses using two alternative profitability measures: Profit margin (the sum of pre-tax 
income, interest expense, and depreciation and amortisation divided by sales) and Return on assets 
(operating income before depreciation scaled by total assets). All ‘odd numbered’ models (1, 3, 5, 7, 
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9 and 11) are without controls and all regressions incorporate firm fixed effects. We found that the 
significant nexus remains unconfounded between the three investment measures and the market 
sentiment indicator. Nevertheless, the estimated impact (measured by the size of the coefficients) of 
the market sentiment indicator on all three measures of firm investment declined after controlling for 
future profitability (comparing against the main result in Table 4 without future profitability controls), 
thus implying that expectation of future profitability causes firms to underinvest in the current year 
relative to low flexibility firms. Hence, although market sentiment continues to have a significant 
impact on firm investment, firms tend to underinvest when managers incorporate future profit levels 
into their strategic decisions. 
 
4.6. Sentiment and investment – the joint effect of financial flexibility-future profitability 
[Table 11 about here] 
 
Despite the valuable insights above, the analysis so far has emphasised a univariate setting and 
considered the firm financial flexibility and future profit expectations separately. However, firm 
financial flexibility and future profit expectations are strongly interrelated. Vogt (1994) evidenced that 
Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow and Myers and Majluf’s (1984) POT provide probable explanations for 
the profitability-cash flow-investment nexus. Implicit in POT are two crucial assumptions about 
managers. First, information asymmetries – the probability that managers have better information 
about the firm’s current earnings and future growth opportunities relative to outsiders, thus motivating 
a strong desire to protect such proprietary information (Dang et al, 2014; Guney & Fairchild, 2011). 
High reliance on internal funds therefore prevents managers from publicly disclosing information 
about the firm’s investment opportunities and the potential profits to be realised from investing in them 
(Myers, 1984). Second, in performing their fiduciary duties managers will aim at maximising 
shareholders’ interests (Ebrahim et al., 2014). Under such a scenario, managers may even forgo 
positive-NPV projects where they require equity issuance and result in a dilution of firm ownership 
(Myers & Majluf, 1984). Because a highly profitable firm has greater financial slack, highly liquid 
assets (cash and marketable securities) plus any unused debt capacity, it may have no incentive to issue 
debt or equity to fund most, if not all, of its investment opportunities (Zona, 2012; Tucker & Stoja, 
2011; Kim et al., 2008). Following this reasoning, prudent managers will attempt to retain financial 
flexibility and at the same time ensure the long-term survivability of their firms. An adjustment in one 
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policy variable leads to an adjustment in the other policy variables. Thus, controlling for the two 
conditions should enhance the robustness of our earlier findings.  
Thus, in this section, we augmented our baseline specification regressing firm investment on 
the managerial indicator and controlled for both financial flexibility and future profitability. The 
findings as reported in Table 11 reveal that controlling for both variables does not confound the 
significant relationship between the market sentiment indicator and firm investment. Nevertheless, we 
observe that, to mitigate information asymmetries, the investment-sentiment sensitivity is greater for 
high financial flexibility firms (HC and LL in Panel A). This result is further confirmed by our robust 
groupings in Panel B – high flexibility firms (HCLL). Thus, the strong desire to protect proprietary 
information about the firm’s investment opportunities and the potential profits to be realised from 
investing in them motivates a high reliance on free cash flows/flexibility during high sentiment periods. 
When profitable firms retain their earnings/profits as equity and build up cash reserves, they create the 
financial slack. This allows financial flexibility and, ultimately, firm investment and long-term 
survival.  
4.7. Financial crisis and the sentiment-investment relationship 
Did the 2008 global financial crisis affect firm behaviour? Two key strands of literature 
examine this hypothesis. The first strand, grounded on the financial constraints theory (shocks to credit 
markets), articulates that the financial crisis worsened credit market conditions (i.e. the quantity of 
credit available declined while borrowing costs increased) (see Ivashina & Scharfstein, 2010; Fazzari, 
Hubbard & Petersen, 1988; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Accordingly, firms responded by cutting capital 
expenditures, reducing debt issuance, drawing down lines of credit and substituting internal liquidity 
for external liquidity (see Campello et al., 2010; Duchin et al., 2010). The second strand, however, 
articulates that firm behaviour during the crisis was not always explained by the financial constraints 
theory. Instead, firms responded directly to the weakening demand (Kahle & Stulz, 2013; Paunov, 
2012) and to risk (Kahle & Stulz, 2013). Duchin et al. (2010) demonstrated that firm investment 
dropped significantly following the onset of the crisis. Particularly, the drop was more prominent for 
firms characterised by fewer internal financial resources – cash reserve and net short debt, thus 
confirming the theory of investment under financial constraints and capital market imperfections (Bo 
et al., 2014).  
Thus, in this subsection, we build on our baseline model presented in Table 4 and empirically 
test whether the 2007/08 crisis impacted on the sentiment-investment nexus for US firms. To do this, 
we split our data into three sample periods (i.e. pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis) and re-estimate the 
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regression models. We present the results in Table 12. 
[Table 12 about here] 
We found that, generally, the impact of market sentiment on investment has been significantly 
driven by the financial crisis effects. The subsample relationship and statistical significance appear 
dissimilar across the three sample periods. For instance, the effect of MSent on investment remains 
insignificant in the pre-crisis period, thus giving confirmation of our hypothesis that, when economic 
conditions are positive, as observed before the crisis, managers underestimate the riskiness of their 
investments and also perceive that the positive state will continue. As such, they undertake high 
investments irrespective of the prevailing risks.  
However, we observed that the coefficient remains positive and significant across the two 
remaining sampling periods – though the impact of market sentiment on investment appears larger and 
more significant in the post-crisis period than in the crisis period. The state of economic conditions 
manifested during the crisis and thus managers began factoring these conditions into their investment 
decisions (Bo et al., 2014). Following robust regulations over the period, the post-crisis period 
envisaged a further enhancement in the sentiment-investment nexus where a fundamental increase in 
market sentiment increases demand for loanable funds, consequently increasing the total level of 
investment under high monitoring and discipline. Thus, there was a more strengthened sentiment-
investment nexus post-crisis. In general, the evidence observed suggests that market sentiment and 
firm investment relationship show varied levels of sensitivity to the 2007/08 financial crisis. 
4.7.1 The financial flexibility implications during the financial crisis 
Despite the valuable insights above which stressed that highly flexible firms (HCLL) have a higher 
likelihood of overinvesting relative to low flexibility firms (LCHL), given that an influx of free cash 
flow and unused debt capacity intensifies managers’ choices to invest more during high sentiment 
periods, we extend this argument to explore whether there is evidence of this contention during the 
2008/09 crisis period versus the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods when the economy is normal. The 
findings as reported in Table 13 confirm our hypothesis that highly flexible firms have a higher 
likelihood of overinvesting more during high sentiment periods relative to low flexibility firms. The 
subsample relationship and statistical significance appear significant for HCLL firms during the pre-
crisis (at the 5% level) and post-crisis (at the 1% level). Although LCHL firms recorded an 
insignificant coefficient during the pre-crisis period, the coefficient was significant (at the 1% level) 
during the post-crisis period, which indicates that fundamental increases in market sentiment increase 
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demand for loanable funds particularly for all firms, consequently increasing their total level of 
investment. Nevertheless, the influx of free cash flow and unused debt capacity in HCLL firms 
intensifies managers’ choices to invest more during high sentiment periods, which may consequently 
increase investment distortions.  
Further, given that the state of economic conditions manifested during the financial crisis – a 
period characterised by high uncertainties, weak business signals and firm failures (Amankwah-
Amoah, 2016; Iwasaki, 2014; Kahle and Stulz, 2013; Paunov, 2012) – managers factored these 
conditions into their investment decisions (Bo et al., 2014). We observe that low flexibility firms 
overinvested during the crisis period perhaps to enhance their ability to survive and overcome the 
adverse effects of the crisis. Highly flexible firms, however, reduced investments during the crisis 
period, hence indicating that, when economic conditions are poor, as observed during the crisis, 
managers of HCLL firms overestimate the riskiness of their investments while perceiving a long 
persistence of the negative state. As such, they reduce their investments in line with the prevailing 
risks. Overall, the evidence confirms that HCLL firms overinvest during high sentiment periods.  
[Table 13 about here] 
4.7.2 The future profitability implications during the financial crisis 
The evidence presented earlier indicates that expectation of future profitability causes firms to 
underinvest relative to low flexibility firms. In this section, we augment our analysis in Table 10 to 
empirically test whether the 2007/08 crisis had implications for the profitability role on the sentiment-
investment nexus for US firms. In line with the findings in Table 12, we found evidence confirming 
that, generally, the implications on the nexus have been significantly driven by the financial crisis 
effects. The subsample relationship and statistical significance appear dissimilar across the three 
sample periods. Taking future profitability into consideration, the effect of MSent on investment is 
insignificant in the pre-crisis period, thus giving confirmation of our hypothesis that, when economic 
conditions are positive, as observed before the crisis, managers undertake investments irrespective of 
the prevailing risks. However, we observed that the coefficient remains economically significant 
across the two remaining sampling periods – though the impact of CEOs’ market sentiment on 
investment appears larger and more significant in the post-crisis period (at the 1% level) than in the 
crisis period (at the 5% level). The estimated impact (measured by the size of the coefficients in the 
even number models of Table 14 – with other firm controls) of the market sentiment indicator on firm 
investment under all subsamples declined after controlling for future profitability relative to the result 
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in Table 12 (models 1, 4 and 7 – without future profitability controls). This finding particularly holds 
for the post-crisis period following robust regulations over the period. In general, the evidence 
observed suggests that the implications of future profitability on the market sentiment and firm 
investment nexus show varied levels of sensitivity to the 2007/08 financial crisis. Although market 
sentiment continues to have a significant impact on firm investment, firms tend to underinvest when 
managers incorporate future profit levels into their strategic decisions particularly during the post-
crisis period. 
[Table 14 about here] 
 
5. Conclusion and Implications 
In this article, we examined the relationship between CEOs’ market sentiment and investment using a 
sample of US firms. Our key arguments are rooted in the behavioural finance literature that contends 
that market sentiment is an important driver of firms’ investment decisions. In particular, we observed 
that the sentiment-investment relationship is significant and positive across all our models, even after 
dealing with possible endogeneity issues. We show that the impact of sentiment on investment is more 
significant in the crisis and the post-crisis periods than in the pre-crisis period. However, we found no 
evidence to indicate that financial flexibility matters in the sentiment-investment relationship. Indeed, 
our results are robust to different measures of both the dependent and the independent variables as well 
as the different econometric methods. 
Moreover, our results offer support for the role of psychological and/or cognitive biases in 
influencing the corporate decisions of firms. We also report strong evidence of the role of future 
profitability in the sentiment-investment nexus although firms tend to underinvest. We further 
observed that financial flexibility motivates firm overinvestment during high sentiment periods. We 
also found that the sentiment-investment relationship tends to be more pronounced in the crisis and 
post-crisis periods. Taken together, the overall evidence obtained suggests that market sentiment is 
imperative to the investment level of the firm.  
From a practical standpoint, our study’s findings indicate that market sentiment can be a 
valuable asset in driving firms’ investment decisions. The effect of sentiment on investment is 
amplified when there is an influx of free cash flow and unused debt capacity. In this way, excess cash 
flow reinforces the sentiment-investment relationship as it intensifies the manager’s choice to invest 
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more during high sentiment periods. 
Notwithstanding these useful findings, it is important to recognise a key potential limitation of 
this study. Specifically, we only looked at one country (the US) and there is the possibility that the 
findings obtained are specific to this setting and not to other settings – especially developing and 
emerging economies. Thus, more broad-based studies focusing on these countries could be looked at 
in future research. Future studies could also explore whether these findings about market sentiment 
might hold in the different cultural and institutional contexts of developing nations in Latin America, 
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Table 1: Description of variables 
 
Variables Description  
 
Panel I: Dependent variables 
Investment (1) 
(INV1) 
Investment 1 is the ratio of net capital expenditure (capital expenditure minus 
depreciation) of firm i to the book value of total property, plant and equipment 
for the current year (Aivazian, 2005; Dang 2011). 
Investment (2) 
(INV2) 
Investment 2 is the ratio of total capital expenditure of firm i to the book value 




Investment 3 is the ratio of net capital expenditure (capital expenditure minus 
depreciation) of firm i to book value of total assets for the current year (Firth 
et al. 2008). 
 
Panel II: Independent variables 
Market Sentiments 
(MSent) 
Market sentiment measured as the average of the past 4 quarter Conference 
Board Measure of CEOs’ Confidence. 
Small Business Optimism 
Index (SBOpt) 
 
Alternate measure of sentiment based on a composite of ten seasonally adjusted 
components from survey of its members. Given that nearly 50% of the US 
private workforce work for small businesses, the measure proxies for the health 
of small businesses. 
University of Michigan 
consumer sentiment index 
(UMSent) 
Alternate measure of sentiment estimated based on telephone surveys on a 
nationally representative sample of households. The measure proxies for the 
future course of the national economy. 
Chicago Board Options 
Exchange Volatility Index 
(VIX) 
 
Alternate measure of sentiment computed from exchange-traded option prices 
on the S&P 500 Index. Specifically, the VIX is computed from the prices 
of out-of-the-money put and call options on the S&P 500 Index. The CBOE 
VIX is the most widely followed benchmark of expected short-term market 
volatility for market participants. 
 
Panel II: Control variables 
Firm size (SZ) Firm size is the natural logarithm of the book value of Total Assets. 
Asset tangibility 
(TAN) 
Asset tangibility is the ratio of fixed assets to the book value of total 
assets. 
Non-Debt Tax Shield 
(NDTS) 
Non-Debt Tax Shield is the ratio of depreciation expense to the book 
value of total assets. 
Return on assets (ROA) 
 
Return on assets is the ratio of total operating profit plus depreciation and 
amortisation (EBITDA) to total book value of assets. It serves as a proxy for 
profitability and the availability of internal funds. 




Earnings volatility is the standard deviation in annual operating income over 
last 10 years to average (absolute) operating income over last 10 years. The 
measure is computed only for firms that have been in existence (and have data) 
for the last 10 years. 
Dividend (DIV) 
 
Dividend is a proxy for whether a firm pays common dividends (i.e. a 
variable equal to one if a firm pays common dividends, and zero otherwise). 
It also proxies for financial constraints. 
Systematic Risk (SYSRISK) 
 
 
Systematic risk captures how an asset covaries with the economy rather than 
with individual assets/company. The CAPM specifies that the expected excess 
return on any stock i is proportional to systematic risk (beta). Thus, we 
decompose the total weekly return of a firm into a market and/or industry 
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(systematic), and a firm-specific or idiosyncratic component: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑟𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +
𝛽𝑖(𝑚𝑘𝑡𝑟𝑓𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
where 𝑟𝑖,𝑡  = stock i return during period t, 𝑚𝑘𝑡𝑟𝑓𝑡 = Fama-French excess 
market return during period t and 𝑟𝑓𝑡  is the risk-free rate during period t. 










Idiosyncratic (unsystematic) risk captures risk caused by internal factors 
associated with independent assets/company rather than the economy. We 
measure the annual idiosyncratic investment volatility for firm i as the volatility 
of the residuals across the 52 weekly observations. Hence, idiosyncratic risk is 
the volatility or standard deviation of the regression residuals (error term, 𝜀𝑖,𝑡), 
i.e. 𝜎𝑖𝑒 =  √∑ 𝜀𝑖,𝜏
2
𝜏∈𝑡       
, where τ indexes weeks 




Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
 Mean St. 
Dev. 
Min Max 25th % 50th % 75th % Observations 
MSent 0.54 0.08 0.35 0.67 0.50 0.53 0.61 76166 
SBOpt 0.95 0.05 0.87 1.05 0.90 0.96 1.01 76166 
UMSent -0.00 0.91 -1.41 1.44 -1.09 0.36 0.75 76166 
VIX 0.20 0.07 0.11 0.33 0.14 0.18 0.24 76166 
INV -0.07 0.34 -1.00 0.56 -0.15 -0.01 0.07 76166 
INV2 0.28 0.28 0.00 1.03 0.09 0.19 0.38 76166 
INV3 0.00 0.05 -0.09 0.12 -0.02 0.00 0.01 76166 
SZ 5.34 2.52 0.47 9.75 3.54 5.45 7.20 76166 
TAN 0.23 0.23 0.00 0.77 0.04 0.14 0.35 56388 
NDTS 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.13 0.02 0.03 0.06 56388 
ROA 0.04 0.23 -0.65 0.32 0.00 0.10 0.17 53230 
GR 0.07 0.68 -0.90 1.96 -0.35 -0.04 0.29 76166 
EVOL 0.52 0.38 0.00 1.45 0.27 0.44 0.71 50004 
DIV 0.27 0.45 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 60098 
SYSRISK 1.06 1.16 -9.90 9.86 0.36 0.93 1.57 61380 
IDIORISK 0.45 0.40 0.00 9.56 0.19 0.34 0.58 50139 
Observations 76166        
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the data. The sample comprises 14,089 US firms over the period 2003 to 
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Table 3: Correlations matrix 
                 
 MSent UMSent SBOpt VIX INV INV2 INV3 SZZ TANN NDTSS ROAA GRR EVOLL DIVV Beta STVOL 
MSent 1.00                
                 
UMSent 0.56* 1.00               
                 
SBOpt 0.49* 0.94* 1.00              
                 
VIX 0.48* 0.82* 0.69* 1.00             
                 
INV -0.01 -0.05* -0.06* -0.05* 1.00            
                 
INV2 0.01 -0.07* -0.07* -0.09* 0.31* 1.00           
                 
INV3 -0.00 -0.08* -0.08* -0.08* 0.72* 0.40* 1.00          
                 
SZ 0.03* -0.01 -0.02* 0.02* 0.19* -0.12* 0.18* 1.00         
                 
TAN 0.02* 0.04* 0.05* 0.04* 0.28* -0.26* 0.30* 0.17* 1.00        
                 
NDTS 0.02* 0.11* 0.12* 0.08* -0.25* -0.07* -0.26* -0.13* 0.37* 1.00       
                 
ROA 0.02* 0.06* 0.06* 0.04* 0.21* 0.01 0.21* 0.50* 0.22* -0.00 1.00      
                 
GR -0.06* 0.13* 0.04* 0.12* -0.02* -0.02* -0.03* -0.05* 0.02* 0.06* -0.07* 1.00     
                 
EVOL 0.21* 0.08* 0.07* 0.13* -0.17* 0.05* -0.17* -0.34* -0.09* 0.16* -0.28* 0.05* 1.00    
                 
DIV 0.02* -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.13* -0.17* 0.11* 0.50* 0.13* -0.12* 0.28* -0.02* -0.34* 1.00   
                 
SYSRISK -0.04* -0.15* -0.13* -0.13* -0.06* 0.07* -0.04* 0.09* -0.05* 0.06* -0.03* 0.01 0.31* -0.10* 1.00  
                 
IDIORISK 0.08* -0.06* -0.01 -0.02* -0.09* 0.05* -0.08* -0.26* -0.05* 0.09* -0.24* -0.03* 0.26* -0.22* 0.15* 1.00 
This table presents the correlation matrix for the data. The sample and variable definitions are as described in Table 1. *** indicates significance at 1% or better
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Table 4: Entire period regression – The Sentiment-Investment nexus 
 Investment 1  Investment 2  Investment 3 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) (11) (12) 
MSent 0.788*** 0.616*** 0.833*** 0.656***  0.547*** 0.485*** 0.594*** 0.599***  0.135*** 0.118*** 0.141*** 0.128*** 
 (0.120) (0.131) (0.119) (0.133)  (0.117) (0.120) (0.116) (0.121)  (0.014) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017) 
               
SZ  -0.045***  -0.005***   -0.065***  -0.017***   -0.007***  -0.001*** 
  (0.006)  (0.002)   (0.005)  (0.001)   (0.001)  (0.000) 
               
TAN  0.031  0.457***   -0.737***  -0.409***   -0.034***  0.052*** 
  (0.037)  (0.016)   (0.032)  (0.012)   (0.005)  (0.002) 
               
NDTS  -3.142***  -3.350***   -1.758***  -0.843***   -0.439***  -0.485*** 
  (0.153)  (0.106)   (0.125)  (0.086)   (0.017)  (0.013) 
               
ROA  0.205***  0.212***   0.271***  0.235***   0.030***  0.029*** 
  (0.022)  (0.016)   (0.020)  (0.014)   (0.002)  (0.002) 
               
GR  0.001  0.004   0.003  0.006***   0.000  0.001*** 
  (0.003)  (0.002)   (0.002)  (0.002)   (0.000)  (0.000) 
               
EVOL  -0.007  -0.003   -0.028***  -0.014**   -0.003**  -0.002** 
  (0.010)  (0.008)   (0.008)  (0.007)   (0.001)  (0.001) 
               
DIV  0.013*  0.012**   -0.002  -0.024***   0.003***  0.002*** 
  (0.007)  (0.005)   (0.005)  (0.004)   (0.001)  (0.001) 
               
SYSRISK  0.004  0.003   0.002  0.003   0.000  0.000 
  (0.003)  (0.002)   (0.002)  (0.002)   (0.000)  (0.000) 
               
IDIORISK  -0.011  -0.024***   0.006  0.008   -0.003**  -0.004*** 
  (0.011)  (0.008)   (0.009)  (0.007)   (0.001)  (0.001) 
               
_cons -0.569*** -0.064 -0.606*** -0.433***  -0.075 0.622*** -0.090 0.150**  -0.084*** -0.003 -0.087*** -0.063*** 
 (0.071) (0.086) (0.071) (0.080)  (0.069) (0.078) (0.069) (0.073)  (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.010) 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes No No  Yes Yes No No  Yes Yes No No 
N 52196 34475 52196 34475  52196 34475 52196 34475  70235 35104 70235 35104 
r2 0.017 0.082 0.018 0.092  0.033 0.152 0.053 0.172  0.032 0.129 0.052 0.159 
N_clust 9817 6547 9817 6547  9817 6547 9817 6547  13218 6657 13218 6657 
Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering within firm-level are given in parentheses. All variable definitions are as described in Table 1. ⁎ Indicates significance at 10%; 
⁎⁎ Indicates significance at 5%; ⁎⁎⁎ Indicates significance at 1%.   
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Table 5: Alternative measure of sentiment – Small Business Optimism (SBOpt)  
 Investment 1  Investment 2  Investment 3 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) (11) (12) 
SBOpt 0.869*** 0.679*** 0.919*** 0.690***  0.603*** 0.535*** 0.655*** 0.659***  0.149*** 0.130*** 0.155*** 0.134*** 
 (0.132) (0.145) (0.132) (0.146)  (0.129) (0.132) (0.128) (0.133)  (0.015) (0.018) (0.015) (0.019) 
               
SZ  -0.045***  -0.005***   -0.065***  -0.017***   -0.007***  -0.001*** 
  (0.006)  (0.002)   (0.005)  (0.001)   (0.001)  (0.000) 
               
TAN  0.031  0.457***   -0.737***  -0.409***   -0.034***  0.052*** 
  (0.037)  (0.016)   (0.032)  (0.012)   (0.005)  (0.002) 
               
NDTS  -3.142***  -3.350***   -1.758***  -0.843***   -0.439***  -0.485*** 
  (0.153)  (0.106)   (0.125)  (0.086)   (0.017)  (0.013) 
               
ROA  0.205***  0.212***   0.271***  0.235***   0.030***  0.029*** 
  (0.022)  (0.016)   (0.020)  (0.014)   (0.002)  (0.002) 
               
GR  0.001  0.004   0.003  0.006***   0.000  0.001*** 
  (0.003)  (0.002)   (0.002)  (0.002)   (0.000)  (0.000) 
               
EVOL  -0.007  -0.003   -0.028***  -0.014**   -0.003**  -0.002** 
  (0.010)  (0.008)   (0.008)  (0.007)   (0.001)  (0.001) 
               
DIV  0.013*  0.012**   -0.002  -0.024***   0.003***  0.002*** 
  (0.007)  (0.005)   (0.005)  (0.004)   (0.001)  (0.001) 
               
SYSRISK  0.004  0.003   0.002  0.003   0.000  0.000 
  (0.003)  (0.002)   (0.002)  (0.002)   (0.000)  (0.000) 
               
IDIORISK  -0.011  -0.024***   0.006  0.008   -0.003**  -0.004*** 
  (0.011)  (0.008)   (0.009)  (0.007)   (0.001)  (0.001) 
               
_cons -0.919*** -0.338** -0.976*** -0.033**  -0.318*** 0.407*** -0.354*** 0.515***  -0.144*** -0.055*** -0.149*** 0.015*** 
 (0.124) (0.140) (0.124) (0.014)  (0.121) (0.128) (0.120) (0.011)  (0.014) (0.018) (0.014) (0.001) 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes No No  Yes Yes No No  Yes Yes No No 
N 52196 34475 52196 34475  52196 34475 52196 34475  70235 35104 70235 35104 
r2 0.017 0.082 0.018 0.092  0.033 0.152 0.053 0.172  0.032 0.129 0.052 0.159 
N_clust 9817 6547 9817 6547  9817 6547 9817 6547  13218 6657 13218 6657 
Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering within firm-level are given in parentheses. All variable definitions are as described in Table 1. ⁎ Indicates significance at 10%; 
⁎⁎ Indicates significance at 5%; ⁎⁎⁎ Indicates significance at 1%.   
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Table 6: Alternative measure of sentiment – Michigan Sentiment Index (UMSent) 
 Investment 1  Investment 2  Investment 3 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) (11) (12) 
UMSent 0.075*** 0.059*** 0.079*** 0.062***  0.052*** 0.049*** 0.057*** 0.059***  0.029*** 0.011*** 0.022*** 0.012*** 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013)  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
               
SZ  -0.045***  -0.005***   -0.065***  -0.017***   -0.007***  -0.001*** 
  (0.006)  (0.002)   (0.005)  (0.001)   (0.001)  (0.000) 
               
TAN  0.027  0.457***   -0.739***  -0.410***   -0.034***  0.052*** 
  (0.037)  (0.016)   (0.032)  (0.012)   (0.006)  (0.002) 
               
NDTS  -3.148***  -3.366***   -1.761***  -0.841***   -0.440***  -0.487*** 
  (0.154)  (0.106)   (0.125)  (0.086)   (0.017)  (0.013) 
               
ROA  0.208***  0.216***   0.275***  0.236***   0.030***  0.030*** 
  (0.022)  (0.016)   (0.020)  (0.014)   (0.002)  (0.002) 
               
GR  0.001  0.004*   0.003  0.006***   0.000  0.001*** 
  (0.003)  (0.002)   (0.002)  (0.002)   (0.000)  (0.000) 
               
EVOL  -0.008  -0.006   -0.025***  -0.012*   -0.003***  -0.003*** 
  (0.010)  (0.008)   (0.008)  (0.007)   (0.001)  (0.001) 
               
DIV  0.013*  0.013***   -0.002  -0.024***   0.003***  0.002*** 
  (0.007)  (0.005)   (0.005)  (0.004)   (0.001)  (0.001) 
               
SYSRISK  0.004  0.002   0.001  0.003   0.000  -0.000 
  (0.002)  (0.002)   (0.002)  (0.002)   (0.000)  (0.000) 
               
IDIORISK  -0.007  -0.009   0.003  0.004   -0.002**  -0.002*** 
  (0.007)  (0.006)   (0.005)  (0.005)   (0.001)  (0.001) 
               
_cons -0.115*** 0.290*** -0.126*** -0.061***  0.240*** 0.904*** 0.253*** 0.497***  -0.011*** 0.065*** -0.009*** 0.010*** 
 (0.004) (0.041) (0.005) (0.014)  (0.003) (0.033) (0.004) (0.011)  (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes No No  Yes Yes No No  Yes Yes No No 
N 52196 34397 52196 34397  52196 34397 52196 34397  70235 35024 70235 35024 
r2 0.017 0.082 0.018 0.092  0.033 0.153 0.053 0.173  0.032 0.129 0.052 0.159 
N_clust 9817 6540 9817 6540  9817 6540 9817 6540  13218 6650 13218 6650 
Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering within firm-level are given in parentheses. All variable definitions are as described in Table 1. ⁎ Indicates significance at 10%; 
⁎⁎ Indicates significance at 5%; ⁎⁎⁎ Indicates significance at 1%.   
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Table 7: Alternative measure of sentiment – CBOE VIX 
 Investment 1  Investment 2  Investment 3 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VIX 0.510*** 0.398*** 0.539*** 0.420***  0.354*** 0.331*** 0.384*** 0.401***  0.014*** 0.078*** 0.011*** 0.084*** 
 (0.078) (0.085) (0.077) (0.086)  (0.075) (0.078) (0.075) (0.079)  (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) 
               
SZ  -0.045***  -0.005***   -0.065***  -0.017***   -0.007***  -0.001*** 
  (0.006)  (0.002)   (0.005)  (0.001)   (0.001)  (0.000) 
               
TAN  0.027  0.457***   -0.739***  -0.410***   -0.034***  0.052*** 
  (0.037)  (0.016)   (0.032)  (0.012)   (0.006)  (0.002) 
               
NDTS  -3.148***  -3.366***   -1.761***  -0.841***   -0.440***  -0.487*** 
  (0.154)  (0.106)   (0.125)  (0.086)   (0.017)  (0.013) 
               
ROA  0.208***  0.216***   0.275***  0.236***   0.030***  0.030*** 
  (0.022)  (0.016)   (0.020)  (0.014)   (0.002)  (0.002) 
               
GR  0.001  0.004*   0.003  0.006***   0.000  0.001*** 
  (0.003)  (0.002)   (0.002)  (0.002)   (0.000)  (0.000) 
               
EVOL  -0.008  -0.006   -0.025***  -0.012*   -0.003***  -0.003*** 
  (0.010)  (0.008)   (0.008)  (0.007)   (0.001)  (0.001) 
               
DIV  0.013*  0.013***   -0.002  -0.024***   0.003***  0.002*** 
  (0.007)  (0.005)   (0.005)  (0.004)   (0.001)  (0.001) 
               
SYSRISK  0.004  0.002   0.001  0.003   0.000  -0.000 
  (0.002)  (0.002)   (0.002)  (0.002)   (0.000)  (0.000) 
               
IDIORISK  -0.007  -0.009   0.003  0.004   -0.002**  -0.002*** 
  (0.007)  (0.006)   (0.005)  (0.005)   (0.001)  (0.001) 
               
_cons -4.383*** -3.387*** -4.633*** -3.609***  -3.009*** -2.747*** -3.269*** -3.390***  0.123*** -6.595*** 0.092*** -7.204*** 
 (6.656) (7.291) (6.620) (7.375)  (6.475) (6.678) (6.440) (6.751)  (0.009) (0.925) (0.009) (0.952) 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes No No  Yes Yes No No  Yes Yes No No 
N 52196 34397 52196 34397  52196 34397 52196 34397  70235 35024 70235 35024 
r2 0.017 0.082 0.018 0.092  0.033 0.153 0.053 0.183  0.032 0.129 0.052 0.159 
N_clust 9817 6540 9817 6540  9817 6540 9817 6540  13218 6650 13218 6650 
Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering within firm-level are given in parentheses. All variable definitions are as described in Table 1. ⁎ Indicates significance at 10%; 
⁎⁎ Indicates significance at 5%; ⁎⁎⁎ Indicates significance at 1%.   
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Table 8: Sentiment on investment: 2-STEP GMM 
 Investment 1 Investment 2 Investment 3 
MSent 3.253*** 2.484*** 0.600*** 
 (1.047) (0.995) (0.133) 
    
SZ -0.022*** -0.037*** -0.005*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) 
    
TAN 0.505*** -0.292*** 0.100*** 
 (0.022) (0.016) (0.003) 
    
ROA 0.555*** 0.363*** 0.079*** 
 (0.051) (0.044) (0.006) 
    
GR 0.019* 0.008 0.002* 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.001) 
    
EVOL -0.199*** -0.175*** -0.045*** 
 (0.066) (0.062) (0.009) 
    
DIV -0.024*** -0.071*** -0.008*** 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.001) 
    
NDTS -2.783*** 0.312* -0.398*** 
 (0.212) (0.171) (0.030) 
    
SYSRISK 0.053*** 0.039** 0.010*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.002) 
    
IDIORISK -0.056* 0.002 -0.010** 
 (0.032) (0.030) (0.004) 
    
_cons -1.606*** -0.668 -0.276*** 
 (0.494) (0.469) (0.063) 
N 16594 16594 16682 
Number of clusters 3445 3445 3461 
K-P WF statistic  4.070 4.070 4.214 
K-P LM statistic 19.344 19.344 18.539 
Hansen J statistic 1.970 2.943 1.970 
Hansen J p-value 0.160 0.086 0.160 
Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering within firm-level are given in parentheses. All variable 
definitions are as described in Table 1. ⁎ Indicates significance at 10%; ⁎⁎ Indicates significance at 5%; ⁎⁎⁎ Indicates 
significance at 1%.    
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Table 9: Effects of financial flexibility 
 Investment 1 
 Panel A  Panel B 
 LC HC LL HL  LCHL LCLL HCLL HCHL 
MSent 0.470*** 0.789*** 1.024*** 0.406**  0.895** 0.359** 1.060*** 0.694** 
 (0.160) (0.215) (0.221) (0.158)  (0.351) (0.174) (0.301) (0.298) 
          
SZ -0.058*** -0.037*** -0.054*** -0.034***  -0.057*** -0.052*** -0.049*** -0.018 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)  (0.016) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) 
          
TAN 0.016 -0.027 -0.075 -0.014  -0.134 0.018 -0.099 -0.088 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.061) (0.048)  (0.099) (0.067) (0.074) (0.076) 
          
NDTS -2.986*** -3.128*** -3.498*** -2.335***  -3.054*** -2.723*** -3.482*** -2.045*** 
 (0.231) (0.218) (0.213) (0.240)  (0.376) (0.316) (0.280) (0.374) 
          
ROA 0.239*** 0.181*** 0.177*** 0.246***  0.226*** 0.253*** 0.155*** 0.186*** 
 (0.036) (0.029) (0.028) (0.036)  (0.054) (0.054) (0.036) (0.053) 
          
GR 0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.001  0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.005 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)  (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) 
          
EVOL -0.024* 0.010 -0.001 -0.008  0.014 -0.039** -0.007 0.029 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.012)  (0.030) (0.015) (0.021) (0.021) 
          
DIV 0.007 0.018 0.023** 0.008  0.012 0.009 0.035** -0.014 
 (0.007) (0.012) (0.011) (0.007)  (0.018) (0.008) (0.015) (0.017) 
          
SYSRISK 0.003 0.002 0.006 0.002  0.001 0.006* 0.006 -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)  (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
          
IDIORISK -0.008 -0.006 0.006 -0.016*  -0.012 -0.010 0.016 -0.030** 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009)  (0.017) (0.009) (0.013) (0.014) 
          
_cons 0.174 -0.276** -0.285** 0.010  -0.075 0.201 -0.396** -0.295 
 (0.108) (0.138) (0.141) (0.109)  (0.227) (0.128) (0.192) (0.195) 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 17467 16930 16662 17735  6623 10844 10039 6891 
r2 0.085 0.080 0.095 0.066  0.085 0.090 0.094 0.057 
N_clust 4387 4664 3960 4502  2305 3060 2925 2755 
Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering within firm-level are given in parentheses. All variable definitions are as described in Table 1. ⁎ Indicates significance at 10%; 
⁎⁎ Indicates significance at 5%; ⁎⁎⁎ Indicates significance at 1%.   
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Table 10: Does future profitability matter? 
 Investment 1  Investment 2  Investment 3 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) (11) (12) 
MSent 0.553*** 0.375*** 0.542*** 0.369***  0.797*** 0.480*** 0.802*** 0.491***  0.089*** 0.044*** 0.096*** 0.044*** 
 (0.075) (0.094) (0.078) (0.096)  (0.080) (0.087) (0.081) (0.088)  (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) 
               
Profma 0.001 0.002*    0.001 0.002**    0.001 0.000**   
 (0.001) (0.001)    (0.001) (0.001)    (0.001) (0.000)   
               
Profmat+1 0.001 -0.001    0.001 -0.001    -0.000* -0.001   
 (0.001) (0.001)    (0.001) (0.001)    (0.000) (0.001)   
               
Profmat+2 -0.001 0.001*    -0.001 0.001    -0.001*** 0.001   
 (0.001) (0.001)    (0.001) (0.001)    (0.001) (0.001)   
               
Profmat+3 0.001 -0.001    0.001 -0.001    -0.000*** -0.001   
 (0.001) (0.001)    (0.001) (0.001)    (0.000) (0.001)   
               
ROA   0.003 0.023***    0.008** 0.030**    0.000 0.001 
   (0.002) (0.009)    (0.004) (0.012)    (0.000) (0.001) 
               
ROAt+1   -0.006*** -0.026***    -0.005** -0.030**    -0.000 -0.000 
   (0.002) (0.009)    (0.002) (0.013)    (0.000) (0.001) 
               
ROAt+2   -0.001 0.007    0.001 0.008*    0.000 -0.000 
   (0.001) (0.006)    (0.001) (0.004)    (0.000) (0.001) 
               
ROAt+3   0.002*** 0.002*    0.002** 0.003***    0.000* -0.001 
   (0.001) (0.001)    (0.001) (0.001)    (0.000) (0.001) 
               
_cons -0.353*** 0.139* -0.351*** 0.160*  -0.154*** 0.690*** -0.149*** 0.699***  -0.043*** 0.046*** -0.047*** 0.049*** 
 (0.043) (0.082) (0.044) (0.085)  (0.045) (0.070) (0.046) (0.072)  (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
All Other Controls No Yes No Yes  No Yes No Yes  No Yes No Yes 
N 27739 18518 25621 18100  27739 18518 25621 18100  36846 18835 32786 18425 
r2 0.008 0.060 0.009 0.062  0.023 0.134 0.026 0.139  0.026 0.098 0.029 0.099 
N_clust 5953 4128 5424 3993  5953 4128 5424 3993  7340 4192 6522 4059 
This table presents the FE estimation results of the recognition of future profit expectations on the investment-sentiment nexus. Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering within 
firm-level are given in parentheses. The sample and variable definitions are as described in Table 1. ⁎ Indicates significance at 10%; ⁎⁎ Indicates significance at 5%; ⁎⁎⁎ Indicates significance 
at 1%.   
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Table 11: Joint effect of flexibility-profitability 
 Investment 1 
 Panel A  Panel B 
 LC LC HC HC LL LL HL HL  LCHL LCHL HCLL HCLL 
MSent 0.007*** 0.026*** 0.745*** 0.742*** 0.612*** 0.579*** 0.197** 0.205**  0.017*** 0.009*** 0.955*** 0.926*** 
 (0.109) (0.112) (0.169) (0.173) (0.169) (0.171) (0.113) (0.113)  (0.116) (0.120) (0.233) (0.233) 
              
Profma -0.000  0.002*  0.002  0.001   0.007  0.003**  
 (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)   (0.005)  (0.001)  
              
Profmat+1 -0.002  -0.001  -0.001  0.001   -0.012*  -0.001  
 (0.004)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)   (0.007)  (0.001)  
              
Profmat+2 0.002  0.001  0.002**  -0.001   -0.015*  0.001  
 (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)   (0.009)  (0.001)  
              
Profmat+3 0.002  -0.001*  -0.002***  0.003**   0.006  -0.002**  
 (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)   (0.005)  (0.001)  
              
ROA  0.051  0.018*  0.038***  0.047*   -0.001  0.052* 
  (0.045)  (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.028)   (0.037)  (0.029) 
              
ROAt+1  -0.056  -0.022*  -0.043***  -0.021   -0.030  -0.056** 
  (0.040)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.035)   (0.028)  (0.028) 
              
ROAt+2  0.066**  0.005  0.010  -0.004   -0.025  0.006 
  (0.034)  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.031)   (0.031)  (0.005) 
              
ROAt+3  -0.001  0.002**  0.000  0.003***   0.003  0.001 
  (0.006)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.000)   (0.003)  (0.003) 
              
_cons 0.528*** 0.495*** -0.289** -0.266* -0.012 0.022 0.223* 0.235*  0.535*** 0.544*** -0.385** -0.379** 
 (0.105) (0.109) (0.133) (0.137) (0.130) (0.132) (0.129) (0.132)  (0.135) (0.135) (0.174) (0.177) 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
All Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 10182 10023 8336 8077 9438 9291 9080 8809  5966 5848 5222 5116 
r2 0.056 0.058 0.061 0.063 0.073 0.072 0.048 0.051  0.073 0.064 0.069 0.068 
N_clust 2875 2810 2709 2597 2638 2580 2646 2539  1916 1871 1822 1774 
Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering within firm-level are given in parentheses. All variable definitions are as described in Table 1. ⁎ Indicates significance at 10%; ⁎⁎ 
Indicates significance at 5%; ⁎⁎⁎ Indicates significance at 1%.   
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Table 12: Effects of crisis 
 Pre-Crisis  Crisis  Post-Crisis 
 Investment 1 Investment 2 Investment 3  Investment 1 Investment 2 Investment 3  Investment 1 Investment 2 Investment 3 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
MSent 0.057 -0.116 0.007  0.063** 0.060** 0.013***  0.616*** 0.527*** 0.120*** 
 (0.097) (0.086) (0.014)  (0.027) (0.025) (0.003)  (0.134) (0.123) (0.017) 
            
SZ 0.008 -0.136*** -0.015***  -0.040* -0.130*** -0.010***  -0.066*** -0.099*** -0.010*** 
 (0.029) (0.022) (0.003)  (0.021) (0.013) (0.002)  (0.009) (0.007) (0.001) 
            
TAN -0.705*** -1.363*** -0.172***  -0.393*** -1.201*** -0.098***  -0.111*** -0.864*** -0.050*** 
 (0.090) (0.112) (0.024)  (0.076) (0.074) (0.012)  (0.043) (0.041) (0.007) 
            
NDTS -0.216 -0.875*** -0.049  -1.213*** -1.275*** -0.164***  -3.048*** -1.763*** -0.410*** 
 (0.271) (0.277) (0.038)  (0.368) (0.298) (0.037)  (0.228) (0.183) (0.027) 
            
ROA 0.049 0.209*** 0.018**  0.090* 0.186*** 0.015***  0.219*** 0.264*** 0.028*** 
 (0.054) (0.046) (0.007)  (0.048) (0.043) (0.005)  (0.029) (0.025) (0.003) 
            
GR 0.002 0.011** 0.000  -0.009 -0.002 -0.000  0.000 0.001 0.000 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.001)  (0.006) (0.005) (0.001)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) 
            
EVOL 0.007 0.029 -0.004  -0.009 -0.033** -0.001  -0.009 -0.019* -0.005*** 
 (0.028) (0.026) (0.003)  (0.018) (0.014) (0.002)  (0.013) (0.012) (0.002) 
            
DIV 0.018 0.019 0.005**  0.021 0.013 0.006***  0.007 -0.003 0.003*** 
 (0.022) (0.016) (0.003)  (0.014) (0.012) (0.002)  (0.008) (0.007) (0.001) 
            
SYSRISK 0.002 0.006 -0.001  -0.000 0.002 0.000  0.006** 0.006** 0.000 
 (0.010) (0.008) (0.001)  (0.004) (0.003) (0.000)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) 
            
IDIORISK 0.023 0.055*** 0.007***  0.019 0.009 -0.000  -0.016* -0.003 -0.003*** 
 (0.016) (0.014) (0.002)  (0.019) (0.012) (0.002)  (0.009) (0.006) (0.001) 
            
_cons 0.008 1.411*** 0.131***  0.277** 1.360*** 0.080***  0.096 0.836*** 0.021* 
 (0.183) (0.144) (0.020)  (0.127) (0.077) (0.011)  (0.100) (0.087) (0.012) 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
N 7276 7276 7340  10774 10774 11001  23123 23123 23594 
r2 0.034 0.135 0.089  0.024 0.125 0.067  0.084 0.163 0.127 
N_clust 4357 4357 4413  4356 4356 4439  5270 5270 5383 
Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering within firm-level are given in parentheses. All variable definitions are as described in Table 1. ⁎ Indicates significance at 
10%; ⁎⁎ Indicates significance at 5%; ⁎⁎⁎ Indicates significance at 1%.   
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Table 13: Effects of flexibility during crisis 
 Investment 1 
 Pre-Crisis  Crisis  Post Crisis 
 LCHL HCLL  LCHL HCLL  LCHL HCLL 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) (11) (12) 
MSent 0.017 0.201 0.376** 0.016**  0.179*** 0.176** 0.003 0.081  0.907*** 0.952*** 1.084*** 0.993*** 
 (0.198) (0.298) (0.171) (0.243)  (0.051) (0.069) (0.055) (0.070)  (0.326) (0.352) (0.263) (0.310) 
               
SZ  -0.004  0.071   -0.039  -0.057   -0.072***  -0.071*** 
  (0.064)  (0.049)   (0.062)  (0.044)   (0.023)  (0.019) 
               
TAN  -0.756***  -1.374***   -0.620***  -0.655***   -0.362***  -0.241*** 
  (0.267)  (0.280)   (0.181)  (0.196)   (0.102)  (0.087) 
               
NDTS  -1.600*  -0.041   -0.996  -2.090***   -3.036***  -3.805*** 
  (0.821)  (0.456)   (1.000)  (0.695)   (0.595)  (0.444) 
               
ROA  -0.003  0.087   0.143  0.027   0.107  0.149*** 
  (0.208)  (0.077)   (0.129)  (0.092)   (0.080)  (0.047) 
               
GR  0.003  0.018**   0.002  -0.005   0.002  0.003 
  (0.020)  (0.008)   (0.016)  (0.010)   (0.010)  (0.005) 
               
EVOL  0.045  0.019   0.058  0.004   -0.036  0.004 
  (0.061)  (0.051)   (0.063)  (0.040)   (0.044)  (0.029) 
               
DIV  -0.117  0.092   0.043  0.025   -0.039*  0.036** 
  (0.090)  (0.067)   (0.036)  (0.034)   (0.024)  (0.017) 
               
SYSRISK  -0.014  0.021   -0.001  0.009   0.002  0.008 
  (0.040)  (0.019)   (0.011)  (0.008)   (0.010)  (0.006) 
               
IDIORISK  0.012  0.041   -0.009  0.058   -0.022  0.008 
  (0.052)  (0.036)   (0.033)  (0.039)   (0.021)  (0.016) 
               
_cons -0.056 0.362 -0.382*** -0.403  -0.061*** 0.304 -0.095*** 0.266  -0.560*** 0.109 -0.771*** -0.210 
 (0.105) (0.407) (0.092) (0.260)  (0.022) (0.361) (0.024) (0.217)  (0.193) (0.259) (0.154) (0.215) 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2898 1638 4408 2008  3394 2647 4533 3144  5365 4029 10128 6863 
r2 0.010 0.047 0.013 0.102  0.017 0.054 0.010 0.037  0.029 0.094 0.043 0.096 
N_clust 1730 1168 2412 1407  1940 1458 2443 1652  2367 1704 3463 2281 
Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering within firm-level are given in parentheses. All variable definitions are as described in Table 1. ⁎ Indicates significance at 10%; 
⁎⁎ Indicates significance at 5%; ⁎⁎⁎ Indicates significance at 1%.   
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Table 14: Future profitability under crisis 
 Investment 1 
 Pre-Crisis  Crisis  Post Crisis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) (11) (12) 
MSent 0.241 0.087 0.139 0.001  0.035** 0.065** 0.031** 0.059*  0.550*** 0.296*** 0.545*** 0.286*** 
 (0.078) (0.103) (0.081) (0.115)  (0.026) (0.031) (0.026) (0.031)  (0.075) (0.104) (0.077) (0.106) 
               
Profma 0.002 0.000    -0.001 0.001    0.000 0.001   
 (0.001) (0.002)    (0.001) (0.002)    (0.001) (0.001)   
               
Profmat+1 0.001 -0.002    -0.002 -0.001    -0.001 -0.002   
 (0.001) (0.002)    (0.002) (0.002)    (0.001) (0.001)   
               
Profmat+2 0.000 -0.003*    -0.001 0.001    -0.000 -0.001   
 (0.001) (0.002)    (0.001) (0.001)    (0.001) (0.002)   
               
Profmat+3 -0.001 0.001    -0.002 -0.002    -0.000 -0.002**   
 (0.001) (0.002)    (0.001) (0.002)    (0.001) (0.001)   
               
ROA   -0.072*** -0.078    0.010 0.026    0.006** 0.036*** 
   (0.018) (0.055)    (0.022) (0.040)    (0.003) (0.014) 
               
ROAt+1   -0.033*** 0.022    -0.031** -0.028    -0.011*** -0.025 
   (0.009) (0.045)    (0.015) (0.019)    (0.002) (0.016) 
               
ROAt+2   -0.040*** -0.040    -0.000 0.007    -0.000 -0.010 
   (0.011) (0.043)    (0.001) (0.017)    (0.001) (0.009) 
               
ROAt+3   -0.004 0.055    0.000 -0.003    0.001 0.001 
   (0.011) (0.058)    (0.001) (0.012)    (0.001) (0.001) 
               
_cons -0.215*** 0.037 -0.157*** 0.099  -0.044*** 0.290* -0.042*** 0.285*  -0.339*** 0.283** -0.338*** 0.297** 
 (0.042) (0.220) (0.044) (0.237)  (0.011) (0.157) (0.012) (0.158)  (0.042) (0.124) (0.044) (0.126) 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other Controls No Yes No Yes  No Yes No Yes  No Yes No Yes 
N 10495 5412 9647 5273  10310 8076 9509 7877  13810 10215 12875 10016 
r2 0.005 0.035 0.009 0.039  0.003 0.030 0.004 0.032  0.008 0.040 0.012 0.045 
N_clust 4278 3211 3866 3113  4146 3126 3823 3028  4563 3240 4150 3138 
Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering within firm-level are given in parentheses. All variable definitions are as described in Table 1. ⁎ Indicates significance at 
10%; ⁎⁎ Indicates significance at 5%; ⁎⁎⁎ Indicates significance at 1%.   
 
